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Abstract
The authors examine the characteristics of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending from the
1960s to 2005. They ﬁnd that there has been an increase in portfolio concentration, that lending
terms have effectively lengthened, and that the proportion of total lending that occurs due to
exceptional access has risen dramatically. Moreover, the typical IMF borrower represents a
greater risk burden than in previous periods. The authors estimate a model of expected credit loss
for the IMF’s portfolio and ﬁnd that the credit risk being borne on the IMF’s balance sheet is
rising over time. This increase in the risk burden is supported by the use of alternative measures of
balance-sheet risk: both the Basel II capital requirement approach and the market-based interest
rate approach produce similar results.
JEL classiﬁcation: F3
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics
Résumé
Les auteurs étudient les caractéristiques des activités de prêteur du Fonds monétaire international
(FMI) des années 1960 à 2005. Plusieurs constats se dégagent : le portefeuille de prêts du FMI est
plus concentré qu’auparavant, il y a eu un allongement effectif de la durée des prêts, et la
proportion des concours consentis au titre de l’accès exceptionnel a augmenté de façon
spectaculaire. En outre, l’emprunteur type actuel de l’institution présente un fardeau de risque
accru. Après avoir estimé un modèle relatif aux créances irrécouvrables anticipées pour le
portefeuille du FMI, les auteurs observent que le risque de crédit qui pèse sur le bilan de
l’institution croît au ﬁl des ans. Cet alourdissement du fardeau de risque est corroboré par les
indicateurs du risque bilan obtenus à l’aide de l’approche d’évaluation des exigences en fonds
propres de Bâle II et de l’approche fondée sur les taux d’intérêt du marché.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F3
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales1.  Introduction 
The ongoing strategic review of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should provide 
the opportunity to assess the  IMF’s  role, functions, and governance. Despite the 
apparently strong interest in the strategic review process by the IMF, G-7, G-20, and 
other interested groups, little actual reform has been proposed. In fact, most of the official 
discourse maintains that the IMF is still the key instrument with which to promote global 
financial stability, and that its role as a centre of multilateral coordination, surveillance, 
and advice, and as a provider of temporary finance, is still relevant.  
 
This sanguine assessment of the IMF’s role and activities stands in stark contrast 
to its recent experience. The IMF’s role in the Asian crisis and subsequent actions in 
Russia, Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey  have  raised numerous concerns.  In particular, 
critics have focused on the use of exceptional access: the granting of loans in excess of 
300 per cent of quota. Exceptional access lending can lead to moral hazard, distortions, 
and delays in the restructuring of private sector claims, and it raises the potential that the 
IMF could experience a conflict of interest during debt restructuring negotiations, since it 
is not a de minimus lender. Moreover, exceptional access lending may have consequences 
for the IMF’s balance sheet.  
 
The growing use of exceptional access  recently  led to  a  sharp increase in 
concentration of IMF credit.
1 This has raised concerns about the financial impact of a 
single large borrower going into  protracted  arrears with the IMF.  Recognizing  the 
increased  credit  risk associated with  the  IMF’s exposure,  the Executive Directors 
approved in 2002 an ad hoc doubling of precautionary balances to about Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) 10 billion.
2,3 At the same time, the Executive Directors asked the IMF staff 
                                                 
1 In 1985, the five largest borrowers accounted for around 43 per cent of total credit, increasing to 70 per 
cent in 1998 and 87 per cent in 2003. 
2 At the end of December 2005, precautionary balances amounted to around SDR7 billion. Precautionary 
balances are created from net income. At the current pace of accumulation, precautionary balances will 
reach the new target in roughly five years.  
3 A glossary of IMF terms, such as precautionary balances and SDR, is provided in Appendix A.  
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Precautionary balances play an extremely important role. They protect 
shareholders against arrears and default on credit outstanding, and shortfalls in income. 
The appropriate level of precautionary balances necessary to ensure the soundness of the 
IMF’s balance sheet is difficult to assess, however, reflecting the nature of the institution. 
For instance, IMF credit is often concentrated among a few large borrowers who have 
recently suffered severe crises. This implies a high level of credit risk for the IMF’s 
balance sheet and, consequently, one would expect that there would be a need for high 
levels of precautionary balances. The IMF’s institutional characteristics, however, could 
mitigate the credit risk stemming from high levels of portfolio concentration and the 
implied high degree of risk that is associated with lending to countries that have recently 
suffered a crisis.  For example,  the I MF  relies on  conditionality,  access limits, and 
preferred creditor status to mitigate credit risk.
5 
 
Despite the risk-mitigating  features of  IMF  lending, t he  decision to increase 
precautionary balances to SDR10 billion by 2010 suggests that the risks to the IMF’s 
balance sheet have risen in the past few years.
6 The objective of this paper is to determine 
whether the level of credit risk being borne on the IMF’s balance sheet has increased over 
time. In particular, this paper will examine whether the provision of exceptional access 
lending led to a greater risk burden for the IMF. To address this question, we will first 
examine the nature of IMF lending and how it has evolved since the IMF’s inception. We 
find that the  IMF  is no longer  solely  offering short-term revolving credits to offset 
                                                 
4 In addition, reserve tranche positions are generally considered part of a country’s international reserves. 
Therefore, shocks to the IMF’s balance sheet that create doubts about the value or liquidity of reserve 
tranche positions would also affect balance sheets of central banks (and/or finance departments) around the 
world. Similarly, shocks that impair the IMF’s balance sheet also serve to reduce its effective forward-
commitment capacity.   
5 Technically, the IMF has not experienced a default in the past 50 years. It has experienced, however, 
protracted arrears. As of December 2005, four countries were in protracted arrears with the IMF: Liberia, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Similarly, many borrowers have accessed funds on an almost continuous 
basis, thereby reducing the IMF’s forward-commitment capacity, raising doubts about borrowers’ ability to 
eventually repay the IMF. 
6 While favourable global liquidity conditions have allowed two of the IMF’s largest borrowers to repay the 
IMF, the likelihood of a return to high levels of exposure is not necessarily a low-probability event.      
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temporary balance-of-payments shocks to a set of countries that can alternately find 
themselves on either side of the balance sheet. Rather, the IMF seems to have de facto 
become  a development bank with a set of permanent creditors and debtors,  offering 
medium- to long-term loans to a set of serial borrowers with poor credit ratings. Given 
the changing nature of IMF lending patterns and borrower characteristics, we estimate a 
model of expected credit loss for the IMF’s balance sheet from 1975 to 2005. The results 
suggest that the implicit risk on the IMF’s balance sheet increased in the late 1990s, 
mostly due to the greater use of exceptional access lending programs. These results are 
supported by applying Basel II risk-weighted credit-risk measures, and a market-based 
interest rate credit-risk model, to the IMF’s balance sheet.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the IMF’s lending has 
evolved over time. This includes a description of IMF borrower characteristics, and their 
comparison with creditor countries. Section 3 assesses the risk in the IMF balance sheet 
utilizing a n  expected-credit-loss approach.  These results are confirmed by the  use of 
Basel II measures of risk-weighted assets  and market-based interest rate credit-risk 
models. Section 4 offers some conclusions. 
 
2.  The Evolution of IMF Lending 
The nature of IMF lending is the primary consideration in assessing the risk to the IMF’s 
balance sheet. The  IMF does not face a portfolio-allocation problem analogous to a 
private lending institution or, for that matter, the World Bank.  Therefore, a ny 
examination of the IMF’s portfolio-allocation  decision must  first  take account of the 
IMF’s objective function. 
 
The IMF’s Articles of Agreement, adopted in July 1944 and entered into force in 
December 1945, stated that t he IMF  would seek to provide the public good of 
international financial stability. Specifically, the  IMF  was created to spread the r isks 
associated with idiosyncratic (temporary) shocks to members’ balance of payments 
through short-term revolving credits, which encouraged members to eschew policies that 
might be destructive of national and international prosperity. Operationally, the I MF  
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would provide temporary assistance to finance temporary shocks to its members; IMF 
members could alternately be on both sides of the IMF’s balance sheet. In this way, the 
IMF is an institution that exists to mitigate and manage risk among its members for their 
mutual benefit.  
 
The functioning of the IMF, as demonstrated in the 1960s, was broadly consistent 
with the precepts set out above. In response to balance-of-payments crises, industrial 
countries often found themselves on  either the creditor or debtor side of the balance 
sheet, and, in terms of the latter, for only a short period of time. For instance, during the 
1960s, Canada, France, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom all 
borrowed from the IMF, for terms of one to six years. The subsequent collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, however, dramatically changed the environment in which the 
IMF operated. The industrial countries that had once been on either side of the balance 
sheet emerged to become permanent creditors by the 1980s. With the advent of flexible 
exchange rate regimes and the development of capital markets—and their ability to have 
continual access to these markets, even in times of crisis—industrialized countries no 
longer needed access to IMF resources. 
 
At the same time, a shift in IMF lending practices occurred in response to the 
Latin American debt crises of the 1980s. In addition to offering short-term loans to 
mitigate the consequences of balance-of-payments crises, the IMF offered longer-term 
loans in order to facilitate structural  (primarily fiscal)  adjustment and, following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, systemic transformation. A key component of this type of 
lending was the ex ante imposition of strong conditionality. Similarly, the IMF’s response 
to the financial and capital account crises of the 1990s reinforced this trend of long-term 
financing, albeit unintentionally in the context of “exceptional access.” Countries such as 
Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey accessed IMF resources in even greater amounts for longer 
terms. Although there may b e some benefits or “public good” associated with this 
development, this clearly does not fall within the IMF’s original mandate. Quantifying 
this shift in IMF lending  and the characteristics of its borrowers  is fundamental t o 
understanding the changing nature of risk in the IMF’s balance sheet. The next section  
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describes  how the IMF’s balance sheet  and the characteristics of its borrowers have 
evolved over time. 
 
2.1  IMF lending  
Since the IMF was formed, the level of its lending facilities has increased markedly, in 
absolute terms.
7 Figure 1 plots IMF lending in SDRs from 1961 to 2005.
8 The pattern of 
IMF lending reveals two notable features. First, there was a sharp increase in lending in 
response to the debt and financial crises in the early 1980s and late 1990s. Second, while 
the overall level of exposures has fallen dramatically in the latter part of 2005, the past 
ten years have witnessed higher levels of exposures. The ratio of loans to total IMF 
resources shows  considerable variation over the sample period ( Figure 2 ). While 
exposures were typically less than 20 per cent of total quota in the 1960s, this ratio rose 
quickly in the 1970s and early 1980s to over 40 per cent, and averaged 25 per cent after 
the 1990s. The proportion of total exposures attributed to the five largest borrowers also 
shows considerable variation over time. Figure 3 plots the degree of concentration for the 
IMF’s five largest borrowers as a percentage of the total loan portfolio from 1961 to 
2005. Interestingly, portfolio concentration in the 1960s was greater than for the 1970s 
and 1980s, although concentration increased considerably in recent years.
9  
 
2.2  IMF lending terms 
The nature of IMF lending terms with respect to the length of exposures has changed 
significantly over time. Figure 4 shows the average number of years over the previous 15 
years for which IMF borrowers had non-zero obligations to the IMF. The striking result 
is the persistence of IMF lending. For example, the average number of years of exposures 
                                                 
7 IMF lending has remained relatively steady as a percentage of world GDP, but has fallen as a proportion 
of overall global capital flows, since private capital flows today dwarf the available resources of the IMF.  
8 The data on IMF lending programs are taken from IMF financial reports. Macroeconomic data are taken 
from the  International Financial Statistics and  World Economic Outlook,  and  from  the World Bank.  
Political risk data are taken from the International Country Risk Guide and institutional data are taken from 
LLSV (1999). Sovereign credit ratings, default rates, and recovery rates are from Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s. Currency crisis dates are from Glick and Hutchinson (1999), updated to the current period. Details 
of the data are provided in Appendix B.  
9 In the 1960s, portfolio concentration was attributable mostly to large programs for the United Kingdom in 
response to episodic pound crises. However, the size of these programs was smaller as a percentage of GDP 
relative to more recent programs for Argentina, Turkey, and Brazil.  
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in the previous 15 years for  the typical IMF borrower in 2005 is 12 years (for the 
previous 10 years, the average is 9 years). This compares to an average length of 
exposure of only 6.5 years in 1975. Thus, the notion that the IMF is providing “revolving 
short-term credits” is not, in fact, true: rather, it would appear that the IMF is effectively 
giving long-term credits to serial borrowers.
10 
 
The increasing length of IMF exposures is not the only dramatic change in IMF 
lending. Since the establishment of the exceptional access framework, many countries 
have been able to borrow formally in excess of 300 per cent of quota. For instance, in the 
1980s, only a few countries had exposures over 300 per cent of quota (with most under 
400 per cent). By the late 1990s, however, when the exceptional access framework was 
established, the proportion of total loans accounted for by lending beyond 300 per cent 
climbed dramatically: close to 75 per cent of outstanding credit in 2004 was in the form 
of exceptional access (Figure 5).
11  
 
Lastly, there is considerable variation in the rates of charge on IMF credit over 
time (Figure 6). The variation in the rate of charge, however, reflects movements in the 
short-term interest rates of the major economies that make up the SDR interest rate, and 
are not necessarily an endogenous rate of charge linked to credit risk. Nevertheless, the 
exceptional access framework does allow for higher rates of charge. For example,  a 
surcharge of 300 to 500 basis points is added to the standard rate of charge for loans 
under the Supplemental Reserve Facility. Similarly, when credit outstanding is above 200 
per cent of quota, there is an additional charge of 100 to 200 basis points. While the basic 
rate of charge for normal levels of access is quite modest, the higher rates of charge for 
exceptional access suggest that there is some  additional  risk  associated with larger 
exposures.
12 Despite the higher rate of charges, exceptional access loans still represent a 
direct subsidy, since the rate of charge is often far below prevailing market rates. For 
                                                 
10 IMF supporters have suggested that “serial” lending reflects the more volatile nature of the underlying 
real economy for today’s IMF borrowers, and hence the greater need for more frequent and extended 
programs. There is no clear evidence, however, that the world economy is more volatile than in the past. 
11 Equally troubling is the level of exceptional access: some countries have borrowed 1700 per cent of 
quota. 
12 There is little evidence, however, that these interest rate surcharges are directly related to the country-
specific credit risk of the borrower.  
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example, the average SDR interest rate in 2002 was 2.2 per cent, while the emerging-
market bond index (EMBI) spread for Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey was over 57.9 per 
cent, 13.8 per cent, and 7.5 per cent, respectively.  
 
In summary, the IMF’s portfolio has evolved considerably over the past 25 years. 
While portfolio concentration has varied over this period, it has recently increased. At the 
same time, lending terms have effectively lengthened. Moreover, the proportion of total 
lending that occurs due to exceptional access has risen dramatically. The question i s 
whether these changes have led to an increase in risk being borne by the IMF. That is, are 
the borrowers that are accessing resources for longer periods in greater amounts as 
riskless as before? A closer look at the characteristics of countries that borrow from the 
IMF is warranted. 
 
2.3  IMF member characteristics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of macroeconomic indicators for IMF borrowers 
and creditors by decade from 1961 to 2004. Average real GDP per capita of an IMF 
borrower from  the  1960s to  the  1990s and beyond was approximately $2700.
13  The 
median per capita GDP  of an IMF borrower,  however,  is higher  in the 1990s.  The 
differences between IMF borrowers and creditors are dramatic: IMF borrowers have 
lower real GDP per capita than creditors, and this gap has widened over time. Similarly, 
the real GDP growth performance of IMF borrowers has deteriorated since the 1960s. 
Likewise, the inflation performance of IMF borrowers is not encouraging, since inflation 
has remained high at both the mean and median. While IMF borrowers are becoming 
more open, current account deficits remain a persistent problem.
14 Interestingly, the level 
of reserves-to-GDP has risen over time for borrowers, although it is still far below the 
                                                 
13 The data from the 1960s  are only suggestive, since data are scarce for less-developed countries.  
Anecdotal evidence, however, highlights the differences between the level of development for IMF 
borrowers in the 1960s and today. IMF borrowers in the 1960s included Canada, France, Spain, Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; comparable countries do not borrow from the IMF today. 
14 Current account deficits are not necessarily a problem, since they may reflect capital inflows for 
investment. They do, however, imply increased foreign borrowing.  
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levels of creditors.
15 And lastly, government debt and debt servicing have increased as a 
proportion of GDP for the average borrower.
16  
 
In summary, the descriptive statistics support the notion that two groups of 
members exist today at the IMF: a group of less-developed countries who are debtors and 
a group of developed countries who are creditors. Moreover, IMF lending today is driven 
by the need to help finance fiscal adjustment in environments of debt and/or capital 
account crises. 
 
3.  Measuring Credit Risk 
3.1  Can the risk be measured at the IMF? 
The descriptive statistics suggest that the characteristics of  current  IMF borrowers, 
relative to creditors (and, for some measures, relative to previous IMF borrowers), have 
deteriorated over time. The question, however, is whether the credit risk of IMF 
borrowers has deteriorated between the 1970s and 2005. The IMF has not ignored the 
level of credit risk on its balance sheet. For example, the IMF (2004) examines how 
credit-risk models are used by other institutions to measure the riskiness of their 
portfolios, and, consequently, what level of precautionary balances need to be held 
against such credit risk. The IMF argues, however, that the application of credit-risk 
models to their organization is not feasible, given the nature of its portfolio and its 
lending mechanisms. Specifically, there are three reasons why the IMF argues against the 
use of credit-risk models. 
 
First, the IMF argues that the implementation of credit-risk models depends on 
diversification: the credit portfolio under assessment needs a large number of assets in 
order to estimate the expected distribution of returns. This is not consistent with the 
                                                 
15 Interpretation of the importance of reserves is confounded by the fact that countries with flexible 
exchange rates do not need to hold high levels of reserves.  
16 The institutional characteristics of IMF borrowers remained stable or improved over the period 1980–
2003. Across measures of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and democracy, there was little improvement for 
IMF borrowers. Investor protection, law and order, and stability, however, improved, leading to an overall 
decrease i n political risk. But, relative to creditors, they still had considerably less institutional 
development. Lastly, there are important differences in legal origin. IMF borrowers tended to have French 
legal origin in the 1980s, and socialist legal origin in the 1990s.  
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IMF’s lending experience. Second,  credit-risk models depend on estimating default 
probabilities; this measure has little relevance to the IMF, however, since it has not 
experienced a default in the past 50 years.
17 Furthermore, the IMF need not be concerned 
with high default probabilities, since structural adjustment programs, conditionality, and 
preferred creditor status help to assure repayment. Third, the implementation of credit-
risk models would imply the formulation of country credit ratings and, consequently, 
credit limits. However, the “Board has consistently viewed a country credit rating system 
for individual Fund members as undesirable” (IMF 2004). This is justified on the basis 
that such a rating system, if it could be implemented and subsequently made public, could 
signal a lack of confidence in a borrowing country. This desire not to utilize country 
ratings is also justified by the need for “uniformity” amongst IMF members. The use of 
collateral in this context is also undesirable, since the “Fund does not require collateral 
for its lending and it is difficult for the Fund to limit exposure” (IMF 2004).
18 The IMF 
therefore concludes that current credit-risk models are not suitable.  
 
The reasons  the IMF gives  for this conclusion, however,  are not without 
contention. First, the concern is misplaced that country ratings, if made public, could 
signal a lack of confidence. It would seem disingenuous to deny markets the information 
content of IMF country ratings. In fact, the IMF’s Article IV consultations are an implicit 
country rating system, and the IMF regularly conducts debt-sustainability analyses for 
program countries. These two sources of country-level information could be easily 
disseminated to markets. Presumably, more information is better—it is hard to imagine 
that markets would be less efficient with this additional information.
19 Additional 
information would also help to assure that the disciplining effect of markets is fully 
employed, without undermining the confidence-building benefits of IMF programs.
20 
                                                 
17 The IMF has suffered losses in terms of net present value. Future work will seek to quantify these losses. 
18 This is disturbing in light of the reaffirmation of access limits in the G-7 Action Plan. 
19 In the absence of private information, it is unlikely that the IMF’s country credit ratings would differ 
much from those provided by private firms. If private information was available, it might not be useful, 
since it would not be verifiable.   
20 Alternatively, there may be no need to release this information as long as the IMF bases the rate of 
charge on an assessment of credit risk. Since the IMF is a “club,” however, such information releases, in 
general, are unlikely.  
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Second, while the nature of the IMF’s portfolio renders certain standard models 
(such as value-at-risk models)  inappropriate for assessing credit risk, this does not 
preclude the use of other risk-based measures. Specifically, measures of expected credit 
loss, or  a risk-based capital adequacy model  in the spirit of Basel II,  could be 
implemented without making strong assumptions about the expected distribution of 
returns for the  IMF’s portfolio. This approach is feasible, since the risk-weighted 
measures used in Basel, although not as technically sophisticated as most value-at-risk 
models, still allow for an assessment of risk.  
 
Third, the claims are not necessarily true that it would be difficult to estimate 
default probabilities for IMF borrowers due to the lack of previous defaults, and that 
credit risk is lessened by the  effectiveness of structural adjustment programs, 
conditionality, and the “guarantee” suggested by preferred creditor status. The lack of 
previous default experience implies nothing about future default probabilities, 
particularly given the dramatic shift in the IMF’s loan portfolio from previous years. 
Moreover, there is no compelling empirical evidence to suggest that conditionality and 
structural adjustment have led to higher repayment rates. In fact, conditionality is often 
not  enforced  (Goldstein 2001), and thus one cannot  rely on its existence as a risk-
mitigating tool. Most importantly, preferred creditor status offers no explicit guarantee 
that a country will not default.
21 The goal of this paper is not to calculate the exact level 
of risk on the balance sheet, but to determine whether there has been a relative change in 
the level of credit risk since the 1970s.  
 
3.2  Measuring expected credit loss: caveats 
The calculation of expected credit loss (ECL) is not necessarily intended to provide a 
precise estimate of the credit risk of the IMF’s portfolio. That is, it is not a prediction of 
expected IMF losses from an accounting perspective; rather, ECL is a proxy for expected 
                                                 
21 In the past, the enforcement of access limits mitigated the potential losses of IMF resources, since the 
cost of compliance with preferred status was relatively small. With the advent of exceptional programs, 
however, and the accumulation of large debt burdens, the cost of honouring the principle of preferred status 
may induce borrowers to default on their obligations to the IMF. This could undermine the consensus of 
preferred creditor status, and thus raises new issues with respect to the required level of precautionary 
balances that must be held by the IMF.    
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economic losses. Essentially, it is a measure of the risk being borne by the IMF, and how 
this risk has evolved over time. In this way, the measure of ECL can also be thought of as 
describing the burden being placed on the  IMF’s risk-mitigation techniques  (i.e., 
preferred creditor status). As an institution that exists to mitigate and manage risk among 
its members, understanding the nature of the risks associated with its lending activities is 
critical for the proper governance of the IMF. While the explicit purpose of this exercise 
is to assess whether there has been a change in credit risk, it is still useful to consider the 
level of credit risk at a point in time. Therefore, in addition to measuring the relative 
changes in risk, this paper estimates a precise measure of expected credit loss, and 
contrasts it to the level of precautionary balances held by the IMF.
22 
 
3.3  Determining sovereign risk 
In order to  estimate the notional expected credit loss of the IMF’s portfolio,  we use 
sovereign credit ratings from Moody’s (and/or Standard & Poor’s) to assess the credit- 
worthiness of IMF borrowers.
23 That is, each borrower is assigned a probability of default 
on its outstanding obligations to the IMF. In this paper, we will use sovereign credit 
ratings, and the implied probability of default associated with such ratings, as the basis 
for determining the creditworthiness of borrowers. A quick examination of the current 
credit ratings of IMF borrowers is revealing. For example, Table 2 lists the credit ratings 
of non-Poverty  Reduction and  Growth  Facility  (PRGF)  IMF borrowers  reported by 
Moody’s as of 2004.
24  The striking feature is the overall poor credit quality of IMF 
borrowers: the typical country has a credit rating of Ba or lower. Essentially, the mode 
credit rating of the IMF’s credit portfolio is “speculative grade.”  
 
The usefulness of sovereign ratings for constructing a measure of the riskiness of 
the IMF’s portfolio is limited, however, by the “unrated” nature of many IMF 
borrowers—most sovereigns were not rated until the mid-1990s. For example, during the 
period 1981–90, only 3 per cent of IMF borrowers had a Moody’s rating, increasing to 
                                                 
22 That is, if the IMF were subject to market discipline, what level of reserves (capital) would be necessary 
for its credit portfolio? 
23 Using sovereign credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s produces quantitatively similar results. 
24 This paper considers borrowers who access only the General Resources Account and excludes PRGF 
borrowers.  
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30 per cent in the 1990s and 56 per cent by 2003. This lack of coverage would suggest 
that is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate  the riskiness of the IMF’s portfolio. 
However, one can estimate credit ratings for those countries that are not rated. Using 
Cantor and Packer’s (1996) approach, one can construct an empirical model  for 
estimating sovereign ratings. 
 
3.4  Determinants of sovereign credit ratings 
Cantor and Packer’s (1996)  approach  is straightforward. Given a set of fundamental 
macroeconomic characteristics, one can estimate the following ordered probit model: 
 
( ) ( ) it it X F R Prob = ,                 (1) 
 
where the  Rit is the Moody’s rating for country  i at time  t,  and  Xit is a s et of 
macroeconomic and country-level institutional variables. The ratings R are ranked 1 = 
Aaa, 2 = Aa, 3 = A, 4 = Baa, 5 = Ba, 6 = B, and 7 = Caa/Ca; a higher numerical value is 
therefore correlated with a lower credit rating. The X’s can include the growth rate of real 
GDP, the current account deficit and the rate of inflation, the level of per capita GDP, the 
degree of openness, and other macro variables that may be correlated with country 
default (such as measures of political risk).   
 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating (1) using a panel-ordered probit model. 
The results are broadly similar to most studies of the determinants of sovereign credit 
spreads. Across the five specifications, higher per capita real GDP and real GDP growth 
are associated with better credit ratings. Poor macroeconomic policy is negatively related 
to c redit risk, since higher inflation rates suggest lower credit ratings. The current 
account, government balance, and degree of openness are not significantly correlated 
with ratings. However, higher debt interest payments as a proportion of government 
revenues are correlated with a lower credit rating. The inclusion of a measure of political 
risk suggests that less political risk (a higher score in the political risk index) is correlated 
to better credit ratings.  Breaking the political index into its components reveals the 
correlations that affect ratings. Better bureaucratic quality and investor protection are  
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correlated w ith better credit ratings. Interestingly, more stable regimes receive lower 
credit ratings, while the degree of democracy, corruption, and law and order are not 
significant. Lastly, institutional origins are considered: countries with French, Socialist, 
and Scandinavian legal origins are more likely to have lower credit ratings than countries 
with English legal origin. The exercise is repeated for finer credit ratings in Table 4. In 
this case, the credit ratings are broken into their subcategories: for example, there are 
seven broad letter categories, with each letter rating broken into three categories. The 
results of estimating the model by ordered probit are qualitatively similar to the coarser 
ratings results. The robustness of the results is checked by using Standard & Poor’s credit 
ratings in place of Moody’s. The results for the estimation of (1) are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar (Table 5).
25 
 
The estimated coefficients can be used to construct predicted ratings for those 
country-year pairs when ratings are not available.
26 The in-sample prediction of sovereign 
credit ratings reveals that the use of  even  a very parsimonious model can produce 
reasonable predicted values. For the entire sample, nearly 60 per cent of the Moody’s 
ratings are predicted exactly (Table 6), and 97 per cent of the predicted values fall within 
one letter grade of the actual rating. The model performs well for predicting Aaa, Aa, Ba, 
and B, while performing poorly for A. This poor performance for the A category is not 
particularly distressing, given that the predicted ratings do not diverge significantly from 
the A range, which has a default rate of zero per cent. Similarly, the model tends to 
overpredict for B - and Ba-rated countries, thus underestimating the default rate  and 





                                                 
25 The results (not shown) are similar for estimates that use “fine” credit ratings. 
26 When there is insufficient macroeconomic data to generate a predicted credit rating, the country is 
assigned a rating based on its average rating. Where no data exist whatsoever, the country is assigned a B 
rating. This is consistent with the Basel II approach of assigning a 100 per cent risk weight to unrated 
sovereigns. This group of countries constitutes only 3–5 per cent of the portfolio for any given year. 
27 Extensive robustness tests were conducted in order to determine the optimal prediction model. While 
some specifications produced more accurate results, this was typically at the expense of lower sample 
coverage. Higher accuracy, however, did not quantitatively change the measure of expected credit loss.  
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3.5  Expected credit loss 
The expected credit loss of the IMF’s portfolio can be assessed utilizing the actual and 
predicted credit ratings from estimating (1). The expected credit loss is constructed as 
follows. For every year, the IMF’s exposure under the General Resources Account for 
each country is multiplied by the respective country’s default rate and then  summed 
across all borrowing countries: 
 
        ( ) ￿ = =
n
i it it t LGD DEF EXP ECL
1 * * ,             (2) 
 
where ECLt is the expected credit loss (ECL) at time t for the next period (year), EXPit is 
country i’s exposure in SDRs to the IMF, DEF is the respective default rate associated 
with the country’s credit rating, and LGD is the percentage loss given default. The loss 
given default is assumed to be 67 per cent, as estimated from observed sovereign defaults 
(Moody’s 2003).
28 The measure of ECL can be estimated for the period one year forward 
to up to five years forward. In the case where ECL is calculated more than one year 
forward, cumulative default rates are used. Thus, the 5 -year ECL is a measure of 
cumulative expected losses five years forward. 
 
Figure 7 shows estimates from 1975 to 2005 for the 1-year-forward ECL, and the 
2-, 3-, and 5-year cumulative ECL.
29 The absolute amount of the ECL rose sharply during 
the early 1980s, as the IMF intervened in the Latin American debt crisis, but then fell 
again until the mid-1990s. IMF lending to the transition economies, through the Asian 
crisis, and the large programs to Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey, have recently led to a 
dramatic increase in  ECL,  with estimates for 2004 at SDR2.6 billion (the  5-year 
cumulative  ECL  is over SDR9 billion). However, the early repayment of Brazil and 
Argentina has led to a rapid fall in ECL.  
 
                                                 
28 This measure is consistent with the LGD in the Argentine case. 
29 The measures of expected credit loss are based on constant levels of exposure over the exposure period.  
While one could argue that exposures should decline as payments are made, this is not necessarily true: 
IMF program lending often results in loans being “rolled over,” at even higher levels of exposure.  
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The measure of ECL assumes that the risk borne by the IMF corresponds to the 
respective sovereign credit rating without any adjustment for the presence of preferred 
creditor status and program conditionality. In order to generate a point estimate of ECL 
that may reflect these features of IMF lending, we re-estimate the model under the 
assumption that each country’s credit rating is one notch higher than observed in the data; 
Figure 8 shows the results.
30 While the “adjusted” measure of ECL is lower in absolute 
terms—the level of 1 -year  ECL  is only  SDR0.9 billion  in 2004 and 5 -year  ECL  is 
SDR4.8 billion—the profile of change in risk remains virtually the same. Nevertheless, 
the level of 5-year ECL has been substantial in absolute terms during the past 10 years.  
 
The respective measures of ECL and adjusted ECL are compared with the level of 
precautionary balances in Figures 9 and 10. In the case of the simple  ECL  measure 
(Figure 9), it is clear that the current level of precautionary balances (as reported in the 
IMF’s Annual Report 2005) was insufficient from 1997 to 2004 given the 5-year-forward 
ECL. But, interestingly, the level of 5-year-forward ECL in 2004 was consistent with the 
projected level of precautionary balances (SDR10 billion) in 2010. On the other hand, the 
“adjusted” measure of ECL (Figure 10) would suggest that the IMF is over-accumulating 
precautionary balances. For the remainder of the paper, we will focus on the unadjusted 
measure of ECL given above. 
 
Figure 11 shows the ratio of ECL to total loans. The ratio of 1-year-forward ECL 
to total loans increased dramatically in the late 1970s, but then remained stable through to 
the mid-1990s. From the Asian crisis onwards, the ratio of ECL to total loans increased 
from 1.6 per cent to over 4.5 per cent (the 3- and 5-year cumulative default rates show an 
even greater increase in the ratio of ECL to total loans—results not shown). Again, it 
would appear that the IMF was bearing more risk on its balance sheet.  
 
A further examination of the data highlights the source of the increased riskiness 
of IMF lending. Figure 11 shows the ratio of ECL to total loans for those IMF borrowers 
                                                 
30 Adding one notch to the sovereign credit rating is standard practice for assessing the credit risk of 
borrowers that access funds from international financial institutions.  
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that have exceptional access, as defined by IMF borrowing above 300 per cent of quota.
31  
From 1975 until 1995, exceptional access lending did not constitute a large proportion of 
IMF credit risk. Since 1997, however, when formal exceptional access guidelines were 
introduced, exceptional access lending has greatly increased, primarily to countries with 
poor credit ratings. Consequently, the one-year-forward ECL attributable to exceptional 
access lending rose from only SDR206 million in 1996 to over SDR2879 million in 2003, 
and the ratio to total loans increased from 0.5 per cent to over 4.4 per cent. Given that 
total ECL was SDR732 million and SDR3041 million in 1996 and 2003, respectively, 
this implies that the proportion of ECL attributable to exceptional access lending has 
risen from 28 per cent to over 95 per cent. Simply, the credit risk on the IMF’s balance 
sheet is increasing due to exceptional access lending. Lastly, Figure 12 shows the ratio of 
precautionary balances to 1-year-forward ECL. Again, the ratio fell steeply from 1975 
until 1983, after which it recovered to more reasonable levels in the early 1990s. As 
before,  however,  the advent of the Asian crisis returned the ratio of precautionary 
balances to 1-year ECL to its level of the 1980s. 
 
The calculation of expected credit loss suggests that the IMF is bearing an 
increasing amount of risk on its balance sheet through its exposure to countries 
borrowing under exceptional access lending. Moreover, it appears that the ratio of 






                                                 
31 “Exceptional access” in this case is based on the de facto definition: countries whose IMF obligations 
exceed 300 per cent of quota as defined in the IMF data base.   
32 The measure of expected credit loss is based on the assumption that the distribution of credit ratings 
remains stable over time. To account for the evolution of credit risk and its effect on expected credit loss, 
we estimate the transition matrix for the entire sample of countries and apply it to IMF borrowers.  
Interestingly, there is little change in the measure of ECL over the sample period of 1985 to 2005. The 
exercise is repeated using a transition matrix for only IMF borrowers. Again, there is little difference in the 
measure of  ECL.  Essentially, the transition matrix for IMF borrowers is neutral  – there is no strong 
evidence that ratings migrate up or down. These results are consistent with Felushko and Santor (2006). In 
that paper, we estimate a model of the effect of IMF program lending on changes in future sovereign credit 
ratings. We find that IMF program lending has no impact on the probability of an upgrade to sovereign 
credit rating one year forward.  
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3.6  Basel II capital requirements 
The measure of  ECL  suggests that the IMF is bearing increasing  credit  risk in its 
portfolio. In order to check the robustness of these results, we examine the evolution of 
risk on the IMF’s balance sheet through the lens of Basel II.
33 In the Basel framework, 
the risk borne on a bank’s balance sheet, and the associated capital requirement, can be 
measured in two ways: the standard (foundation) approach and the internal-ratings-based 
(IRB) approach.
34 Each will be considered in turn. 
 
Under the standard approach, banks must hold capital against their risk-weighted 





A  BBB   BB to B  C  Unrated 
Risk 
weight 
0  20  50  100  150  100 
 
Then, the capital requirement is calculated as 8 per cent of risk-weighted assets. Under 
the IRB approach, however, the notion of “expected” credit loss is not the basis of capital 
requirements. Rather, given that banks provision against expected loss out of current 
income, it is the unexpected losses that require capital.
35 The IRB approach utilizes this 
notion of unexpected losses for calculating capital requirements. The IRB approach for 
capital requirement K for each period t is calculated as follows: 
 
        ￿ = =
n
i it t K K




                                                 
33 The Basel II framework was designed to assess risk for highly granular portfolios, and was not intended 
for the lumpy nature of IMF lending.  
34 The IRB approach was developed to allow banks to utilize their own sophisticated internal-risk models, 
and the history of their associated credit-rating behaviour, in order to calculate capital requirements, instead 
of relying on the cruder risk assessments implied by the foundation approach. 
35 The precautionary balances held by the IMF can be thought of as capital held against expected and 
unexpected losses. The IMF, however, does not explicitly provision against specific losses.  
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where 
          ( ) ( ) ( ) it it it
it
it it
it EAD LGD PD EAD
N PD N
















1 2 / 1 1
,   (4) 
 
where K is the capital requirement for each asset risk category i = 1,…n; LGD is loss 
given default; N is the cumulative normal distribution;r is the correlation between assets; 
EAD is exposure at default; and PD is the probability of default for the respective risk 
category. Therefore, the total capital requirement is the sum of capital charges for each 
asset class. The correlation between assets,  r , is set by the Basel committee as follows: 
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Additionally, the Basel II committee suggests that the exposure at default can be adjusted 
by the following maturity factor: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) PD b M PD b · - + · · -
- 5 . 2 1 5 . 1 1
1 ,            (6) 
 
where M is the average maturity and b(PD) is the adjustment to maturity: 
 
        ( ) ( )
2 log 05898 . 0 08451 . 0 PD b · - = .             (7) 
 
The first term of ( 4) represents unexpected losses and the second term represents 
expected losses. Since expected losses are  provisioned for under prudential risk 
management, they are subtracted from required capital under Basel II.  
 
The Basel II IRB framework described above is implemented using the IMF’s 
credit portfolio under the following assumptions. The LGD is set at 67 per cent and the 
EAD is the outstanding IMF credits owing.
36 For simplicity, maturity is set at 2 years 
(Illing and Paulin 2004), although average IMF exposures are much longer (and would 
                                                 
36 The level of EAD initially excludes undrawn commitments, but this can be added in future work. This 
would only serve to increase capital requirements in the late 1990s.  
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sovereign credit ratings, as is the probability of default. When sovereign credit ratings are 
not available, they are estimated as before. For countries with ratings of Baa or higher, 
the probability of default is set arbitrarily low at 0.01 per cent to 0.04 per cent for Aaa to 
Baa. 
 
  Figure 13 shows t he capital requirements under the standardized  (foundation) 
approach.  Capital requirements rise from modest levels in the  late 1970s  to over 
SDR5.4 billion in 2003, although this f ell considerably  by the end of 2005. 
Unsurprisingly, the standard approach mimics the profile of ECL. The consequences for 
the IMF are made more explicit by the calculation of IRB capital requirements. Figure 14 
shows the estimation of (3) for the IMF’s portfolio from 1975 to 2004. The results are 
very similar to the profile of ECL, with dramatic increases in capital requirements from 
SDR4.7 billion in 1995 to over  SDR10.0 billion in 2004, although it falls to 
SDR4.5 billion in 2005. Figure 15 plots the ratio of precautionary balances to capital 
requirements. From the early 1980s onwards, the ratio falls below 100 per cent, and 
remains close to 40 per cent for the remainder of the 1980s and 1990s, but rises 
dramatically at the end of the period.  This suggests that the level of precautionary 
balances may have been inadequate relative to the risk being borne on the IMF’s balance 
sheet. 
 
3.7  Market-based measures of expected credit loss 
The measure of expected credit loss and Basel II capital requirements depends heavily on 
the use of sovereign credit ratings and their associated default histories. In order to check 
the robustness of our measure of expected credit loss, we also consider a “market-based” 
approach. Buckle, Cunningham, and Davis (2000) estimate a “point-in-time” default 
rating based upon bond yield spreads. In their set-up, the default rate is a function of the 

















,                         (8) 
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where yit is country i’s yield spread at time t of the appropriate sovereign bond and r is 
the risk-free rate.  
 
In order to implement this measure, the yield spread is taken from the EMBI+ (the 
difference between a basket of U.S.-dollar-denominated sovereign bonds or varying 
maturities and the corresponding basket of U.S. government securities). Unfortunately, 
the limited coverage of the EMBI+ data restricts the  breadth and time frame of the 
analysis. Thus, the measure of expected credit loss implied by market interest rates is 
calculated and then compared with the standard measure of ECL only for those countries 
with market interest rate data. Figure 16 shows the results of estimating (8). The pattern 
of market interest rate-based expected credit loss follows the more standard measure, 
although at a higher level and with more volatility. Nevertheless, the market interest rate 
measure of ECL confirms the previously observed pattern: the IMF was taking on more 
credit risk during the period 1997–2004 than before. 
 
4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
The evidence obtained  from examining the IMF’s portfolio since 1961 indicates  that 
there has been a dramatic shift in the nature of IMF lending. The most striking features of 
this change are (i) the recent relative increase in the concentration of the portfolio, (ii) the 
average length of years of continuous access to IMF resources, and (iii) the deterioration 
of the credit quality of those borrowers who access funds. The descriptive statistics are 
illuminating: the average IMF borrower is relatively poorer than before (even more so 
when compared with creditors), and is more dependent on the IMF. Unsurprisingly, this 
is reflected in the sovereign credit ratings of IMF borrowers, which are, on average, 
speculative grade. The calculation of a simple expected credit-loss metric suggests that 
the credit risk in the General Resources Account has increased significantly in the past 
decade. Particularly, the increase in risk can be tied to exceptional access lending to 
countries that have poor sovereign credit ratings. This increase in risk is confirmed by the 
use of alternative measures of balance-sheet risk: both the Basel II capital requirement 
approach and the market-based interest rate approach produce similar results.  
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Critics of this credit-risk approach would argue that any measure of expected 
credit loss is inappropriate: because of the unique nature of its balance sheet and its lack 
of default histories, the IMF has not experienced a default in the past 50 years. Moreover, 
the critics would assert that the existence of preferred creditor status, and the use of 
conditionality, implies that the IMF faces lower credit risk than empirically suggested by 
any conventional credit-risk model.  
 
The use of credit-risk models to assess the risk being borne by the IMF cannot be 
immediately dismissed simply because of the existence of preferred creditor status and 
conditionality.  The fact that the IMF is in the process of adjusting its level of 
precautionary balances suggests that it acknowledges the increased credit risk on its 
portfolio. This accumulation of precautionary balances is not without concern. On the one 
hand, if precautionary balances are being accumulated to mitigate against credit risk, then 
IMF members should be concerned. Precautionary balances reflect retained earnings, and 
so their use against losses implies that IMF members will see a reduction in their IMF 
equity. On the other hand, if the rate of accumulation of precautionary balances is higher 
than necessary, then members would also bear costs, since precautionary balances are 
unremunerated. Furthermore, the accumulation of precautionary balances implies that the 
rate of charge and the rate of remuneration are higher and lower, respectively, than would 
otherwise be the case.  Consequently, determining the level of precautionary balances 
should not be left to ad hoc decisions of the Executive Board, but should take account of 
the actual level of expected credit loss. 
 
 In this paper, we find that the IMF may face future increased credit risks due to 
the use of exceptional access. This implies that the IMF, in lieu of more standard risk-
management techniques, would have to rely more heavily on the efficacy of preferred 
creditor status, and the effectiveness of conditionality, to ensure the integrity of its 
balance sheet. However, one may be concerned that recent challenges to the legal 
foundations of preferred credit status may diminish the effectiveness of this tool in 
mitigating credit risk. Similarly, if conditionality is not strictly enforced, its effect on the 
creditor’s willingness and ability to repay may be hindered.  Consequently, given the  
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potential violability of preferred creditor status and conditionality, the increase in the 
level of precautionary balances may be warranted. In any case, it is important to pursue 
quantitative measures of credit risk in order to better appreciate the ongoing evolution of 
IMF lending and the associated credit risk on its balance sheet.  
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Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators for IMF Members  
 
Borrowers        Non-Borrowers     
 
      1961-  1971-  1981-  1991-    1961-  1971-  1981-  1991- 
      1970  1980  1990  2004    1970  1980  1990  2004   
 
 
 Real GDP per capita  2828  2612  2794  2744    4411**  9429**  8829**  11766**   
  (US$ market)    869  882  1087  1731    1193  5752  4026  8900   
 
Real GDP growth    4.57  4.27  2.77  1.74    5.70**  5.28*  3.14  3.38**   
 (per cent)    4.75  4.59  3.25  3.11    5.28  5.00  3.01  3.10   
 
Current account/     -3.72  -4.94  -5.48  -4.16    -3.84  1.45**  -2.42**  -1.58   
  GDP      -3.09  -3.97  -3.95  -3.20    -0.63  -0.42  -1.13  -0.90   
 
Inflation      8.3  14.9  42.9  91.3    3.6*  11.1**  6.3*  16.3**   
      3.1  10.6  8.9  85.7    3.0  8.0  4.7  3.0   
     
Trade/GDP    37.1  58.7  64.8  79.3    63.3**  80.2**  90.9**  93.6**   
         34.9  51.7  53.8  74.6    58.5  74.6  79.7  79.0   
 
Reserves/GDP    4.7  8.3  8.0  12.1    10.1**  18.2**  19.5**  18.8** 
      3.7  6.0  5.7  10.4    6.7  12.1  11.8  11.7 
 
Debt service/GDP    2.8  3.5  6.1  5.7    2.0  2.0**  3.7**  4.3** 
      2.4  2.7  5.3  4.8    1.0  1.3  2.7  3.2   
 
Short-term debt/    9.3  9.9  11.7  15.7    4.7**  15.5**  19.3**  15.8 
  GDP      7.4  7.7  9.4  12.3    0.0  12.3  12.3  14.1 
 
 
Source: World Bank, IMF. **,* indicates that the t-statistic of the null hypothesis of identical means for the IMF and 
non-borrowers, for each decade subsample, is rejected at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. IMF 
borrowers are those countries that had at least one liability to the IMF during the period. Means appear in the first row, 
and medians in the second row, for each variable.  
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Baa and above  Ba and below    No rating 
 
Lithuania   Argentina    Algeria             
Panama    Brazil       Belarus          
Russia    Bulgaria       Bosnia and Herzegovina         
    Dominican Republic  Gabon               
    Ecuador      Grenada   
    Indonesia     Iraq   
    Jamaica      Liberia      
    Jordan      Serbia - Montenegro   
    Papua New Guinea   Somalia 
    Peru      Sudan 
Philippines    Uzbekistan 
Romania        
Turkey         
               Ukraine         
Uruguay          
 
Source: Moody’s, IMF  
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Table 3: Determinants of Sovereign Credit Ratings  
 
Ordered probit estimation 
Dependent variable: Moody’s credit rating (coarse)               
Marginal effects                    Macro, 
              Macro,    Macro,    Legal 
Macro    Macro    Political risk  Political risk  origin 
Variables     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
     
GDP per capita    -1.134**   -0.626**   -0.547**   -0.411**   -0.649** 
        (0.164)    (0.232)    (0.238)    (0.202)    (0.222) 
Real GDP growth    -0.060**   -0.074**   -0.087**   -0.086**   -0.058** 
      (0.017)    (0.020)    (0.021)    (0.022)    (0.018) 
Current account/     -0.270    -0.317    -0.832    -2.406*     0.354       
GDP      (1.283)    (1.390)    (1.430)    (1.372)    (1.411) 
Inflation      0.108**    0.067**    0.065**    0.078**    0.050**   
      (0.021)    (0.019)    (0.020)    (0.026)    (0.021) 
Government        1.297    1.250    2.947    3.154   
  Balance/GDP        (2.228)    (2.349)    (2.566)    (2.527) 
Trade/GDP        0.176    0.157    0.222    -0.030 
          (0.391)    (0.403)    (0.416)    (0.403) 
Reserves/GDP        0.203    0.551    -0.831    0.123   
          (1.252)    (1.195)    (1.083)    (1.106) 
Interest payments/        2.949**    2.447**    3.506**    3.682** 
  revenue         (0.832)    (0.837)    (0.934)    (0.830) 
Developing country        2.653**    2.459**    2.588**    2.819** 
          (0.402)    (0.421)    (0.457)    (0.505) 
 
Political risk            -0.023*         
              (0.013)         
Bureaucratic quality              -1.009** 
                  (0.182) 
Corruption                0.088 
                  (0.113) 
Democracy                0.006 
                  (0.080) 
Investor protection               -0.257** 
                  (0.055) 
Law and order                -0.052 
                  (0.105) 
Stability                  0.142** 
                  (0.036) 
                 
Legal origin (UK excluded)                   
  French                      0.795** 
                      (0.356) 
  Socialist                     0.821* 
                      (0.427) 
  German                     -0.883** 
                      (0.442) 
  Scandinavian                    0.888** 
                      (0.373) 
 
Wald Chi
2    92.61    234.44    207.32    256.79    246.42 
Pseudo R
2    0.27    0.39    0.39    0.48    0.44 
N      1089    711    615    614    701 
 
** and * indicate significance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively.  Standard errors are 
corrected for cluster effects by country. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
Ordered probit estimation 
Dependent variable: Moody’s credit rating (fine)               
Marginal effects                    Macro, 
              Macro,    Macro,    Legal 
Macro    Macro    Political risk  Political risk  origin 
Variables     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
     
GDP per capita    -1.133**   -0.678**   -0.595**   -0.477**   -0.681** 
        (0.154)    (0.223)    (0.222)    (0.192)    (0.210) 
Real GDP growth    -0.063**   -0.079**   -0.090**   -0.088**   -0.063** 
      (0.017)    (0.020)    (0.021)    (0.022)    (0.018) 
Current account/     -0.343    -0.415    -1.055    -2.370*     0.333      
GDP      (1.203)    (1.399)    (1.412)    (1.290)    (1.409) 
Inflation      0.113**    0.074**    0.073**    0.093**    0.059**   
      (0.015)    (0.023)    (0.019)    (0.019)    (0.028) 
Government        2.197    2.319    3.998*    3.743   
  balance/GDP        (2.116)    (2.254)    (2.378)    (2.371) 
Trade/GDP        0.096    0.110    0.167    -0.106 
          (0.382)    (0.391)    (0.402)    (0.399) 
Reserves/GDP        0.158    0.458    -0.907    0.045   
          (1.236)    (1.216)    (1.184)    (1.146) 
Interest payments/        2.778**    2.293**    3.207**    3.384** 
  revenue         (0.771)    (0.796)    (0.875)    (0.794) 
Developing country        2.522**    2.319**    2.309**    2.675** 
          (0.414)    (0.439)    (0.468)    (0.528) 
 
Political risk            -0.024*         
              (0.012)         
Bureaucratic quality              -0.954** 
                  (0.159) 
Corruption                0.068 
                  (0.108) 
Democracy                0.038 
                  (0.070) 
Investor protection               -0.250** 
                  (0.051) 
Law and order                -0.089 
                  (0.099) 
Stability                  0.151** 
                  (0.034) 
                 
Legal origin (UK excluded)                   
   French                      0.678** 
                      (0.339) 
  Socialist                     0.749* 
                      (0.406) 
  German                     -1.071** 
                      (0.406) 
  Scandinavian                    0.749* 
                      (0.406) 
 
Wald Chi
2    130.05    254.24    224.51    376.08    245.14 
Pseudo R
2    0.20    0.29    0.29    0.35    0.32 
N      1090    711    615    614    701 
 
** and * indicate significance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
corrected for cluster effects by country. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Sovereign Credit Ratings  
 
Ordered probit estimation 
Dependent variable: Standard & Poor’s credit rating (coarse)             
Marginal effects   
                      Macro, 
              Macro,    Macro,    Legal 
Macro    Macro,    Political risk  Political risk  origin 
Variables     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
     
GDP per capita    -1.215**   -0.796**   -0.768**   -0.622**   -0.794** 
        (0.136)    (0.212)    (0.211)    (0.180)    (0.202) 
Real GDP growth    -0.061**   -0.063**   -0.084**   -0.076**   -0.044** 
      (0.017)    (0.020)    (0.018)    (0.023)    (0.019) 
Current account/     -0.857    1.437    0.770    -0.827     1.601      
GDP      (1.370)    (1.754)    (1.984)    (2.046)    (1.934) 
Inflation      0.157**    0.066    0.091*    0.124**    0.030   
      (0.060)    (0.047)    (0.050)    (0.043)    (0.037) 
Government        1.809    1.051    2.516    3.458*   
  balance/GDP        (2.561)    (2.290)    (2.436)    (2.415) 
Trade/GDP        0.469    0.246    0.445    0.251 
          (0.311)    (0.359)    (0.361)    (0.316) 
Reserves/GDP        -1.269    -0.635    -2.031    -1.591   
          (1.374)    (1.499)    (1.406)    (1.346) 
Interest payments/        4.580**    3.418**    4.080**    5.474** 
  revenue         (0.916)    (0.934)    (1.060)    (0.886) 
Developing country        1.956**    1.880**    1.765**    1.915** 
          (0.403)    (0.479)    (0.459)    (0.484) 
 
Political risk            -0.017*         
              (0.010)         
Bureaucratic quality              -0.837** 
                  (0.211) 
Corruption                0.022 
                  (0.111) 
Democracy                0.174** 
                  (0.073) 
Investor protection               -0.233** 
                  (0.053) 
Law and order                -0.207* 
                  (0.108) 
Stability                  0.156** 
                  (0.038) 
                 
Legal origin (UK excluded)                   
   French                      0.799** 
                      (0.305) 
  Socialist                     0.923** 
                      (0.344) 
  German                     -0.661 
                      (0.525) 
  Scandinavian                    0.595 
                      (0.438) 
 
Wald Chi
2    180.94    161.12    188.63    298.83    170.21 
Pseudo R
2    0.28    0.38    0.38    0.46    0.42 
N      1063    725    598    597    721 
 
** and * indicate significance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
corrected for cluster effects by country. 
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Table 6: Predicted vs. Actual Sovereign Credit Ratings (1984–2004)   
 
        Predicted   
Moody’s                    Correct 
Rating    Actual    Aaa  Aa  A  Baa  Ba  B  Caa  (%) 
 
 
Aaa    140    110  30  0  0  0  0  0  77.7 
Aa    120    48  72  0  0  0  0  0  60.0 
A    71    1  17  29  19  5  0  0  40.8 
Baa    103    0  2  11  55  33  2  0  53.4 
Ba    105    0  0  0  33  59  13  0  56.2 
B    68    0  0  0  7  18  43  0  63.2 
Caa    7    0  0  0  0  0  7  0  0.0   
 
        Predicted   
S&P’s                      Correct 
Rating    Actual    AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B  CCC  (%) 
 
 
AAA    139    114  25  0  0  0  0  0  82.0 
AA    132    42  80  10  0  0  0  0  60.1 
A    79    2  18  43  10  6  0  0  54.4 
BBB    86    0  0  21  32  30  3  0  37.2 
BB    102    0  0  5  22  59  16  0  57.8 
B    52    0  0  0  5  18  29  0  55.8 












































































































Figure 2: IMF Lending, Ratio Loans-to-Quota
  





















































































Figure 4: Average Number of Years of IMF Exposures
  

























































Ratio of exceptional access loans to total loans






































Figure 6: SDR Interest Rate
  































































































































































































































Figure 8: Adjusted Expected Credit Loss
  



































































































































































































































Figure 10: Adjusted ECL and Precautionary Balances
  

















































































































































































Figure 12: Precautionary Balances/1-Year ECL
  






































































































































Figure 14: Basel II Capital Requirements
  




































































































































































































Figure 16: Market-Based ECL
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Appendix A: Glossary 
 
exceptional access – The granting of loans in excess of 300 per cent of quota. 
 
General Resources Account (GRA) – The account that handles the majority of lending 
between the IMF and member countries. It is a pool of currencies and reserve assets built 
up from members’ quotas. 
 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) – The PRGF (previously known as 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)) is a low-interest (0.5 per cent), 
long-term (up to 10 years) lending program intended for low-income nations. 
 
precautionary balances – Balances that include the IMF’s reserves and the special 
contingent account; they are intended to provide protection against the risk of an income 
shortfall and capital losses. 
 
preferred creditor status – Debtors give priority to repayment of their obligations to the 
IMF over other creditors. 
 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) – The unit of account used by the IMF. SDRs are a 
potential claim on the usable currencies of the IMF members, and are defined in terms of 
a basket of major world currencies. 
 
Stand-by Agreement (SBA) – Non-concessional loans intended for temporary balance- 
of-payment shocks. 
 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs)/conditionality – Loans from the IMF with 
certain conditions regarding economic policies or structural reforms. The borrowing 
country is required to meet these conditions to continue the program. 
 
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) – A facility to provide financial assistance to a 
member country that is experiencing exceptional balance-of-payments difficulties. The 
difficulties arise from a large short-term financing need resulting from a sudden and 
disruptive loss of market confidence, which is reflected in pressure on the capital account 
and the member’s reserves. 
 
transition matrix – Indicates the probability that a bond rating will change within one 
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Appendix B: Data 
 
Macroeconomic data 
Source: World Bank 
Real GDP/capita, expressed in US$2000. 
Growth rate of real GDP. 
Current account balance as a ratio of GDP. 
GDP deflator inflation. 
Government balance as a ratio of GDP. 
Trade as a ratio of GDP 
Reserves as a ratio of GDP. 
Interest payments as a ratio of government revenue. 
Bilateral trade as a ratio of GDP. 
Debt service as a ratio of GDP. 
Short-term debt as a ratio of external debt. 
 
Ratings data 
Sources: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s 
 
IMF program data 
Sources: IMF IFS (IFS), IMF Annual Reports (AR) 
 
Political stability 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
Political risk (0 = highest risk, 100 = lowest risk). 
Bureaucratic quality (0 = lowest quality, 4 = highest quality). 
Corruption (0 = highest corruption, 6 = lowest corruption). 
Level of democracy (0 = least democratic, 4 = most democratic). 
Investor protection (0 = lowest protection, 12 = highest protection). 
Law and order (0 = lowest level of law, 6 = highest level of law). 
Stability (0 = least stable, 12 = most stable). 
 
Legal origin 
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1999) 
 
Bond spreads 
Source: JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) 
EMBI (basis-point spread between a sovereign bond basket of yields and a long-term 
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